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LEGISLATIVE AND PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE:
SHOULD THE SOCIAL VIEWPOINTS OF RELIGIOUS
GROUPS PLAY NO ROLE?
VINCENT M. DI LORENZO*

This article explores the willingness of the legal academy to
consider the viewpoints of religious groups and leaders in public
policy debates. The specific context studied is the debate over
corporate social obligations. I found that the legal academy rarely
considers the viewpoints of religious groups and leaders in its public
policy debate. This article then explores why this is so. The relevance
of such viewpoints are examined, as well as, the ambiguity generated
by the United States Supreme Court in its opinions interpreting the
First Amendment. Neither lack of relevance nor constitutional
uncertainty seems to adequately explain the legal academy's treatment
of religious-based views.

I. A STUDY OF PUBLIC POLICY DEBATE IN THE LEGAL ACADEMY
For several years, I have been studying efforts to stimulate
economic development in low-income communities and the role
private corporations should play. This study led me to examine the
subject of corporate social responsibility. The banking industry has
long been subjected to a legislative obligation to provide credit to lowincome communities.' Congress has also sought to impose similar
obligations on other financial services providers, such as mortgage
banks, insurance companies, and investment banks.2 Exploring the
academic debate over whether social obligations should be
legislatively imposed on various members of the financial services
industries, I realized that I did not encounter public policy viewpoints
of any religious leader or group in the legal literature. Had I missed
the references? Or was there nothing relevant that a religious leader or
group had to say?

* Professor of Law, St. John's University and Senior Fellow, Vincentian Center for
Church & Society.
1. See Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, 12 U.S.C. § 2901-2908 (1977).
2. See, e.g. H.R. 865, 107th Cong. §101 (2001) (proposing nonbank affiliates of bank
holding companies that engage in lending or offer banking services be subject to the
Community Reinvestment Act of 1977).
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I decided to undertake a study of the legal literature. My aim
was to determine how often the viewpoints of religious groups and
leaders appeared in the published debates of the legal academy
concerning corporate social responsibility. My study sample consisted
of all articles published in United States law school journals, other
than student-authored pieces, during the five-year period, from
September 1995 to August 2000. 3 I examined all such articles listed in
the Index to Legal Periodicals during this period under the topic
"corporate social responsibility."
Some of the law journal articles are merely doctrinal in that
they examine only what the law permits. They are not intended to
examine why the law permits what it does or to explore what the law
should be. In other words, the purely doctrinal articles are not
intended to discuss justifications for legal doctrine, including possible
justifications put forth by religious leaders or groups. Therefore, such
articles were excluded from the final sample. This narrowing process
provided a study sample of forty-four articles, which discussed the
topic of corporate social responsibility and the possible justifications
for recognizing or refusing to recognize such responsibility. The
Appendix contains a list of the forty-four articles, which formed the
final sample. These articles forming the final sample are hereafter
referred to as the "Articles."
Corporate social responsibility is a concept that covers a broad
range of topics. In general, authors of the Articles examine issues,
such as responsibilities to "stakeholders," e.g., employees and local
communities in which the corporation operates, as well as
responsibilities to the larger society, especially in the environmental
area.
The Articles' authors also investigate corporate ethical
obligations including standards imposed by law and regulations
contained in model codes of conduct, and corporate philanthropy as a
means to respond to social needs. As discussed above, in all Articles
in the sample, the authors had made the decision to examine the
justifications for or against permitting or requiring actions by
corporations in furtherance of a social obligation.
Only three authors of the forty-four Articles discussed the
viewpoints of religious groups or leaders, 4 either briefly or in passing.
3. This was the five-year period covered by volumes 35 to 39 of the Index to Legal
Periodicals.

4. See generally Edward S. Adams & Karl D. Knutsen, A CharitableCorporateGiving
JustificationFor the Socially Responsible Investment of Pension Funds: A PopulistArgument

for the Public Use of Private Wealth, 80 IOWA L. REv. 211 (1995). See also Timothy L. Fort,
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Even this number is an overstatement. One of the three articles was on
the topic of corporate philanthropy, where the author mentioned the
viewpoints of religious groups only in the portion of the article
discussing the historical background of charitable giving. 5 That left
only two of the forty-four Articles in which the authors discussed or
otherwise mentioned the viewpoints of religious groups or leaders in
the portion of the article exploring possible justifications for corporate
social obligations. One of these two articles was written by a
professor of philosophy,6 leaving only one article in the sample written
by a legal academic or other individual with a background in law that
7
discussed or mentioned the viewpoints of religious groups or leaders.
Interestingly, four additional articles briefly mentioned that
some viewpoints of corporate actors could be influenced by religious
beliefs or values. Yet the authors neglected to provide any examples
of particular beliefs or values. The authors also failed to provide
citations to any religious beliefs or values, and did not choose to
include such religion-based viewpoints in their discussion of possible
justifications for acts of corporate social responsibility. Curiously,
thirteen additional articles mentioned moral judgments as a basis for
particular corporate social obligations. 9 Yet out of the thirteen articles,
CorporateConstituency Statutes: A Dialectical Interpretation, 15 J.L. & COM. 257 (1995);
Joseph S. Spoerl, The Social Responsibility of Business, 42 AM. J. JURIS 277 (1997).
5. See Adams & Knutsen, supra note 4, at 227-39 (noting that "charitable giving is an
important concept in Judeo-Christian history and culture.").
6. See Spoerl, supra note 4, at 277.
7. See Fort, supra note 4, at 268-71 (questioning "...[I]f
religion is to play a role in
public life, whose religion will it be?").
8. See Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy From a Corporate Governance
Perspective, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1091 (1997); Timothy L. Fort, The Corporation as
Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate
Constituency Statues, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173 (1997); Peter D. Hall, Business Giving and
Social Investing in the United States, 1790-1995, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 789 (1997); David
Hess, Social Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to CorporateSocial Responsiveness, 25 J.
CORP. L. 41 (1999).
9. See Constance E. Bagley & Karen L Page, The Devil Made Me Do it: Replacing
CorporateDirector's Veil of Secrecy with the Mantle of Stewardship, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
897 (1999); Thomas W. Dunfee, CorporateGovernance in a Market With Morality, 62 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 129 (1999); Jill E. Fisch, Questioning Philanthropy From a Corporate
Governance Perspective, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1091 (1997); Timothy L. Fort, The
Corporation as Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis of Stakeholder Theory and
Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 173 (1997); David Hess, Social
Reporting: A Reflexive Law Approach to CorporateSocial Responsiveness, 25 J. CORP. L. 41
(1999); Marianne M. Jennings & John Entine, Business With a Soul: A Reexamination of
What Counts in Business Ethics, 20 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'Y 1 (1998); Faith S. Kahn,
Pandora's Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate Philanthropy, 44
UCLA L. REv. 579 (1997); Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Human Corporation: Some Thoughts
on Hume, Smith, and Buffet, 19 CARDOZO L. REv. 341 (1997); Michelle Sinclair & Joseph
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none of the authors cited or discussed any religious group or leader as
a source of such moral judgments. When citations were provided, they
were solely to secular sources.
Overall, the findings of this study confirm that the legal
academy does not discuss the viewpoints of religious groups or leaders
in its debates over justifications for or against legal recognition of
corporate social obligations. The published literature discusses many
possible justifications for various corporate social obligations,
including viewpoints with which the authors disagree. Thus, possible
disagreement with the viewpoints of religious groups and leaders or
possible failure to find such viewpoints persuasive does not explain the
results.
It appears such viewpoints are either overlooked or
deliberately ignored.
I wish to make it clear that I am not pointing the finger at
others. One of the Articles was my own.' 0 I developed the concept of
a "social enterprise," which was first suggested by Robert Dahl, the
Yale political scientist.''
In exploring possible justifications for
legislatively imposed corporate social obligations for that article, it had
not occurred to me to examine the viewpoints of religious groups or
leaders.

II. You SPEAK, BUT Do You HAVE SOMETHING To SAY?
One explanation for the failure of the legal academy to discuss
the viewpoints of religious groups and leaders on the topic of
corporate social responsibility was that such sources do not provide
relevant information. This explanation seemed unlikely, but relevance
could not be assumed. I explored this issue by investigating an

Galaskiewicz, Corporate-NonprofitPartnerships: Varieties and Covariates,41 N.Y.L. ScH.
L. REV. 1059 (1997); Lewis D. Solomon, Reflections of the Future of Business Organizations,
20 CARDOZO L. REV. 1213 (1999); Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax
Treatment of CorporatePhilanthropy,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835 (1997); David B. Wilkins,
Do Clients Have Ethical Obligations to Lawyers? Some Lessons From the Diversity Wars, 11
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 855 (1998); W.A. Wines & M.S. Buchanan & D.J. Smith, The Critical
Need for Law Reform to Regulate the Abusive Practices of TransnationalCorporations: The
Illustrative Case of Boise Cascade Corporationin Mexico's Costa Grande and Elsewhere, 26
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 453 (1998).
10. See generally Vincent M. Di Lorenzo, Equal Economic Opportunity: Corporate
Social Responsibility in the New Millennium, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 51 (2000).
11. See Robert A. Dahl, A Prelude to Corporate Reform, I Bus. & Soc'y REV. 17
(1972) (defining "social enterprise as an entity whose existence and decisions can be justified
only insofar as they serve public or social purposes").
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example of a religious group's viewpoint that was probably relevant to
the public policy debate on corporate social responsibility.
In 1986, the National Conference of Catholic Bishops wrote a
letter entitled "Economic Justice for All,"' 12 and later, wrote a
companion letter entitled "A Decade After 'Economic Justice For All'
in 1995.13 These two "letters" are hereafter collectively referred to as
the Document. A quick review of the Document demonstrates its
relevance to the public policy debate. Relevance can be measured in
various ways. One measure is the standard of whether the source
provides new ideas or a different perspective. The comparison would
be to the ideas and perspectives in the sources that were discussed in
the Articles, which formed the study sample. Judged by this standard,
the Document provided a different perspective on various issues.
The Document posits for example, that:
" The economy exists to serve the human person, not
the other way around.
" Economic life should be shaped by moral principles
and ethical norms.
" Economic choices should be measured by whether
they enhance or threaten human life, human dignity,
and human rights ....
" The moral measure of any economy is how the
weakest are faring.14
The Conference of Bishops also puts forth the view that, "the measure
of our economy is not only what it produces, but also how it touches
human life, whether it protects or undermines the' 5dignity of the human
person, and how it promotes the common good."'
This viewpoint leads to conclusions regarding the obligations
of all owners of capital to others, whether the owners are corporations
or individuals. Specifically,

12. See Economic JusticeFor All: PastoralLetter on Catholic Social Teaching and the
U.S. Economy, in TENTH ANNIVERSARY EDITION OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL 13,13-137
(United States Catholic Conference, Inc. 1997) [hereinafter EconomicJustice ForAll].
13.

See A Decade After "Economic Justice For All ": Continuing Principles,Changing

Context, New Challenges, in TENTH ANNIVERSARY EDITION OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE FOR ALL 3,
3-12 (United States Catholic Conference, Inc. 1997) [hereinafter A Decade After "Economic
Justice ForAll "].

14. Id.at 6.
15. Id.at 4.
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Property owners, managers, and investors of financial
capital must all contribute to creating a more just
society. Securing economic justice depends heavily on
the leadership of men and women in business and on
wise investment by private enterprises.'6
The Conference of Bishops' viewpoint also leads to
obligations flowing, curiously enough, from the recognition of the
importance of private ownership in United States society. Rather than
arguing that private ownership leads to autonomy, the Document
presents another view:
[P]rivate ownership ... is an important element in a just
economic policy. It enlarges our capacity for creativity
and initiative. Small and medium - sized farms,
businesses, and entrepreneurial enterprises are among
the most creative and efficient sectors of our economy.
They should be highly valued by the people of the
United States, as are land ownership and home
ownership. Widespread distribution of property can
help avoid excessive concentration of economic and
political power. For these reasons ownership should7 be
made possible for a broad sector of our population.'
In addition, the Document presents a different view of the role
of private efforts relative to the role of government. It is a view that
flows from the concept of subsidiarity found in Catholic Social
Teaching. 18 Namely,
[G]ovemment should undertake only those initiatives
which. exceed the capacity of individuals or private
groups acting independently. Government should not
replace or destroy smaller communities and individual
initiative. Rather it should help them to contribute
more effectively to social well-being and supplement

16. See Economic Justice ForAll, supra note 12, at 5 3.

17. Id. at 53-4.
18. See THOMAS MASSARO, LIVING JUSTICE 128-132 (2000) (explaining "[t]he term
subsidiaritycomes from the Latin word for assistance ... [I]t refers to the way various levels
of society should relate to and assist one another to bring about the best outcomes for all
people").
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their activity when the demands of justice exceed their
9
capacities. 1
This is a view that does not relegate the role of caring for others to
government alone or to government primarily. Moreover, government
has another important role to play beyond supplementing private
efforts.
Businesses have a right to an institutional framework
that does not penalize enterprises that act responsibly.
Governments must provide regulations and a system of
taxation which encourage firms to preserve the
environment, employ disadvantaged workers, and
Managers and
create jobs in depressed areas.
stockholders should not be torn between their
responsibilities to their organizations and their
responsibilities toward society as a whole.2 °
There are other examples of new ideas or different perspectives
contained in the Document. The Document mentions the concept of
2
private ownership of property being subject to a "social mortgage," '
and the concept that owners of firms are accountable to owners of
human capital [workers] or social capital [communities] from which
they have benefited.
One need not agree with or endorse these positions in order to
discuss them. There were many viewpoints discussed in the Articles
with which the individual authors disagreed. Yet such viewpoints
were discussed as long as they contributed to the debate, while the
viewpoints of religious groups or leaders were not included.
As discussed previously, relevance in public policy debate can
be defined in a manner other than the introduction of new ideas or
19. See Economic Justice ForAll, supra note 12, at 56.
20. Id.at 54.
21. Id. at 54. See also MASSARO, supra note 18, at 137 (concluding the holding of
property is conditioned on fulfilling social obligations to others, requiring owners to not
disregard the needs of the less fortunate, use their property in ways that harm them, or exclude
them from full participation in society). See also Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Toward a Property
Ethic of Stewardship, in PROPERTY AND VALUES: ALTERNATIVES TO PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP 21-22 (Charles Geisler ed., 2000) (describing the Judeo-Christian concept of

stewardship is that civil title to land is not absolute. "With title comes to care for the land and
use it for the betterment of the landowner, the landowner's community, and future
generations.").
22.

See Economic Justice For All, supra note 12, at 53.
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different perspectives. Relevance may be found to exist due to a
difference in perspective that enriches the public policy debate.
Relevance may also be found to exist because a particular view is
shared by a large constituency. Some of the arguments made in the
Document are also made as part of the viewpoints of secular sources.
Yet, the similar arguments are only parts of a larger perspective. As a
whole, the viewpoints found in secular sources are not identical to the
viewpoints found in the Document. Moreover, as to the arguments
that overlap, without attempting to uncover who put forth a particular
viewpoint first, relevance in public policy debate is also measured by
representation of a larger constituency.
In my study of the corporate social responsibility literature I
found that the most-widely discussed perspective was that of Milton
Friedman. Friedman stated the sole obligation of corporate entities
was to maximize profits, and any other use of corporate resources was
a waste of corporate assets. 23 Why was this source so frequently cited
and discussed in the Articles? I do not think the answer lies in the
status Friedman enjoys in the economic community. I think the
answer lies in the belief on the part of authors of these articles that this
was a view shared by many, i.e., that Friedman was voicing the view
of a larger constituency. For that reason, Friedman's viewpoint
needed to be considered. Relevance viewed from this perspective
takes on special significance for the views of religious groups and
leaders.
Such views similarly reflect the views of a larger
constituency.
III. You SPEAK, BUT CAN I LISTEN?

A possible explanation for the failure of the legal academy to
discuss the views of religious groups or leaders in the debate over
corporate social obligations is that it is thought to be constitutionally
impermissible to consider such viewpoints when the debate involves
possible rules of law. In other words, the First Amendment constrains
the debate or, perhaps, there is a belief that it does. This explanation is
plausible, but it seems to offer an incomplete explanation for the
actions of the legal academy.
First, the rulings of the United States Supreme Court have
generated uncertainty rather than certainty on this issue.
Commentators universally agree that the First Amendment's right to
23. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits,
N.Y. TIMES MAG. Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
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free speech permits religious groups and leaders to present their views
to government decision makers, such as the Congress. 24 It would be a
hollow right of free speech in the political arena if religious groups and
leaders could speak, but decision makers were absolutely forbidden to
listen to their positions, i.e., if legislators were forbidden from basing
any decision, even in part, on religious views. The Supreme Court has
sustained legislative enactments, even when a state legislature cited
religious viewpoints as a primary justification for the enactment. 25 Yet
it has also ruled such enactments unconstitutional when based solely
26
on religious viewpoints. Between the extremes of no secular purpose
and solely a secular purpose, the Court has suggested a legislative
enactment can be sustained if supported by both secular and religious
27
purposes when purpose is defined as motivation.
I do not wish to engage in debate over whether and to what
extent religious viewpoints may form the basis for legislative decisions
or other rules of law. It is sufficient to say that there is uncertainty.
Turning to the viewpoints of constitutional scholars, there is a
difference of opinion on the distinct issue of the wisdom of relying on
religious viewpoints. Some opine that religious viewpoints should
never form the sole basis for legislative decisions. 28 Others urge that

24. See STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 106 (1993). See also id. at 255

(discussing the view of Professor Laurence Tribe, who generally favors a separation of church
and state but who notes "[t]he participation of religious groups in political dialogue has never
been constitutional anathema in the United States...").
25. E.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Court noting Petitioner's
reliance on the "Old and New Testaments and the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas to show
that 'traditional Judeo-Christian values proscribe [sodomy]."').
26. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585 (1987) (holding Louisiana's
Creationism Act in violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because it
lacked a clear secular purpose). See also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 48-9 (1985)
(holding Alabama's law that authorized a one-minute-of silence period in public schools
unconstitutional).
27. See Wallace, 472 U.S. at 55-6.
28.

See MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL

PERSPECTIvES 6, 9-38 (1997) (arguing "neither citizens nor even legislators violate the
nonestablishment norm by presenting religious arguments in public political debate, but a that
political choice would violate the norm if no plausible secular argument supported it). More
recently Michael Perry has seemingly modified his position. Cf Michael J. Perry, Institute of
Bill of Rights Symposium: Religion in the Public Square: Why Political Reliance on
Religiously Grounded Morality Does Not Violate The Establishment Clause, 42 WM & MARY
L. REv. 663, 670-72 (2001) (stating "the nonestablishment norm forbids government to
privilege one or more churches. It does not forbid legislators (or other policymakers), even
when they happen to constitute a legislative majority, to make a political choice disfavoring
conduct on the basis of a religiously grounded belief that the conduct is immoral; that is, it
does not forbid them to base the political choice on a moral belief just in virtue of the fact that,
for them, that belief is religiously grounded).
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for
religious viewpoints should form the basis, in whole or in part,
29
decisions.
legislative
some
for
or
generally
decisions
legislative
It is possible that this uncertainty generated by the United State
Supreme Court, and this difference of opinion regarding the wisdom of
using or relying on religious viewpoints, explains the decision of legal
academics to almost completely ignore the viewpoints of religious
groups and leaders in their writings. This does not, however, seem to
offer a complete explanation. In other areas of the law, uncertainty or
difference of opinion has not stopped all consideration by legal
academics. Moreover, what is troubling is that in the corporate social
responsibility debate, what has been silenced is the entire message
based solely on the source.

IV. KILLING THE MESSAGE BECAUSE OF THE MESSENGER
The Court's decisions questioning, on First Amendment
grounds, the freedom of Congress or state legislatures to rely on
religious viewpoints in making legislative decisions involve religious
viewpoints. The academic difference of opinion regarding the wisdom
of introducing religious arguments into a political debate similarly
relates to religious viewpoints. However, not every viewpoint put
forth by a religious group or leader is a religious viewpoint.
Some principles found in the Document, for example, present
religious beliefs. The obligation of all members of society to the poor
and vulnerable, for example, was based on the teaching of the
Scriptures.
However, many views and perspectives found in the
Document do not present religious beliefs. The difficulty is, of course,
in defining what constitutes a religious belief. Many participants in
the academic debate over the wisdom of introducing religious
viewpoints in public policy debate have chosen not to define the
phrase. Michael Perry defined a "religious" viewpoint as a belief in

29. CARTER, supra note 24, at 111-12 (concluding "[tihe idea that religious motivation
renders a statute suspect was never anything but a tortured and unsatisfactory reading of the
First Amendment); See generally KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND
POLITICAL CHOICE 247 (1988) (recommending that people should not try to implement

positions derived from religious beliefs that are clearly contrary to positions people would
reach based on shared premises and commonly accessible reasons). See also id. (deducing "[i]t
is proper to rely on religious convictions to define which entities deserve protection and to
resolve difficult questions involving uncertain facts and conflicts of values.").
30. See Economic JusticeFor All," supra note 12, at 16-17.
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God or a belief in the will of God.31 The viewpoint becomes nondebatable, because it is an article of faith.
When applying Perry's definition, there is a great deal
contained in the Document that is not presented as being God's will.
There are positions in the Document that are not articles of faith but
are issues subject to debate. The role of government versus private
parties in meeting social needs, for example, is not founded on the will
of God.32 The benefits of creativity and initiative resulting from
private ownership and the resulting desire to expand opportunities for
private ownership is similarly not presented as God's will.33 Both
concepts are possible vehicles that present approaches to help realize
the goals of the Document. Both are debatable perspectives. Neither
are articles of faith.
In summary, constitutional uncertainty would not seem to have
the power to almost completely foreclose academic consideration of
the viewpoints of religious groups and leaders. Moreover, there is
constitutional certainty regarding the viewpoints of such sources,
which are not religious in nature. Yet all such viewpoints have been
overlooked or ignored.
The most plausible explanation, in whole or in part, for the
findings in this study can arguably be found in another arena. In the
related sphere of the role of religion in science, the prevailing models
in the scientific community for the relationship between religion and
science are either a model of conflict or a model of separation. 34 In the
former, religion and science are at war, with each trying to eliminate
the other.35 In the latter, there is a wall erected between science and
religion, with neither field speaking with or listening to the other. 36 It
seems the legal academy has also chosen to create a wall of separation.
Another model has been suggested for the scientific
community that can prove more useful. It is a model of dialogue. 37 In
this model, it is recognized that science or law can benefit from the
viewpoints of religious groups or leaders. This is certainly true, for
example, when such groups or leaders are addressing social issues on
31.

See PERRY, supra note 28, at 31.

32. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (explaining the principle of
subsidiarity).
33. See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing private ownership and how
that can adversely affect the demands of the common good).
34. See IAN G. BARBOUR, RELIGION AND SCIENCE: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY
ISSUES 77-89 (1997).
35. Id. at 77.
36. Id. at 84.
37. Id. at 90-105.
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the basis of social viewpoints. The perspectives presented are both
novel and representative of a broad constituency. As a result, they can
enrich the academic and public policy debate.
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APPENDIX

Articles in the Study Sample Indexed in the Index to Legal Periodicals
under the topic "Corporate Social Responsibility"
VOLUME 35
Edward S. Adams & Karl D. Knutsen, A Charitable Corporate Giving Justification
For the Socially Responsible Investment of Pension Funds: A PopulistArgument for
the Public Use of Private Wealth, 80 IOWA L. REv. 211 (1995).
Timothy L. Fort, Corporate Constituency Statutes: A DialecticalInterpretation, 15
J.L. & COM. 257 (1995).
VOLUME 36
Douglass Cassell, Corporate Initiatives: A Second Human Rights Revolution, 19
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1963 (1996).
Richard Grossman, Revoking the Corporation, 11 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 141 (1996).
Faith S. Kahn, Pandora'sBox: ManagerialDiscretionand the Problem of Corporate
Philanthropy,44 UCLA L. REv. 579 (1997).
VOLUME 37
Rikki Abzug & Natalie J. Webb, Rational and Extra-Rational Motivations for
Corporate Giving: Complementing Economic Theory With OrganizationScience, 41
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1035 (1997).
Jayne W. Barnard, CorporatePhilanthropy,Executive Pet Charities,and the Agency
Problem, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1147 (1997).
Jill E. Fisch, Questioning PhilanthropyFrom a Corporate Governance Perspective,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1091 (1997).
Timothy L. Fort, The Corporationas Mediating Institution: An Efficacious Synthesis
of Stakeholder Theory and Corporate Constituency Statutes, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REv. 173 (1997).
Peter D. Hall, Business Giving and Social Investing in the United States, 1790-1995,
41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 789 (1997).
Faith S. Kahn, Legislatures, Courts, and the SEC: Reflections on Silence and Power
in Corporateand Securities Law, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 1107 (1997).
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Nancy J. Knauer, Reinventing Government: The Promise of InstitutionalChoice and
Government Created CharitableOrganizations,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 945 (1997).
Daniel E. Lazarof, Promoting CorporateDemocracy and Social Responsibility: The
Need to Reform the FederalProxy Rules on ShareholderProposals, 50 RUTGERS L.
REV. 33 (1997).
Barbara B. Lindsay, The CharitableContributor Under the I.R.C., 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 825 (1997).
David Millon, Default Rules, Wealth Distribution, and Corporate Law Reform:
Employment At Will Versus Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 975 (1998).
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Human Corporation: Some Thoughts on Hume, Smith,
and Buffet, 19 CARDoZO L. REV. 341 (1997).

Michelle Sinclair & Joseph Galaskiewicz, Corporate-Nonprofit Partnerships:
Varieties and Covariates,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1059 (1997).
Hayden W. Smith, If Not Corporate Philanthropy,Than What?, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV.757 (1997).
Linda Sugin, Theories of the Corporation and the Tax Treatment of Corporate
Philanthropy,41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 835 (1997).
Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance With the Law in the Era of Efficiency,
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